In an auction with a buy price, a seller offers bidders the opportunity to forgo competing in an auction by transacting immediately at a pre-specified fixed price. If a seller has aspirations in the form of a reference price that depends upon the auction's reserve price and buy price, she does best to keep her aspirations sufficiently low by designing a no-reserve auction with a buy price low enough that some bidder types would exercise it with positive probability in equilibrium. The seller is indifferent between the auction component of her mechanism being a first-or second-price auction.
Introduction
From the growth of auctions on the Internet emerged a new selling mechanism, an auction with a buy price. In an auction with a buy price, a seller offers bidders the opportunity to forgo competing in an auction by transacting immediately at a pre-specified fixed price. The "Buy-It-Now" feature of industry leader eBay is a leading example of an auction with a buy price.
1 In the first quarter of 2009, eBay's sales (Gross Merchandise Volume) were $12.8 billion, 49% of which were through buy price transactions.
2 Thus, auctions with buy prices are popular among buyers and sellers in online auctions and are economically significant. That auctions with buy prices are so popular poses somewhat of a puzzle from the vantage point of standard auction theory. Namely, when demand is uncertain and markets are thin, the market price is unclear and auctioning dominates fixed price selling from a seller's perspective (Milgrom, 1989; Wang, 1993) . Thus, when a seller has an auction mechanism at her disposal online, the option to augment her auction with a fixed price seems unnecessary. A growing theoretical literature studies this "hybrid" mechanism and seeks to understand under what conditions a seller would benefit from augmenting her auction with a buy price. Existing rationales for auctions with buy prices include: Bidder or seller risk aversion (Budish & Takeyama, 2001; Hidvégi, Wang, & Whinston, 2006; Mathews & Katzman, 2006; Reynolds & Wooders, 2009 ); bidder or seller impatience (Mathews, 2004) ; auction transaction costs for bidders (Wang, Montgomery, & Srinivasan, 2008) ; seller competition and multi-unit demands (Kirkegaard & Overgaard, 2008) ; price discrimination when the set of bidder types is not connected (Bose & Daripa, 2009) ; and bidder reference-dependence (Shunda, 2009) . This paper contributes to this literature by exploring a model of auctioning with aspirations. I model a seller with aspirations as one who evaluates outcomes in relation to some fixed reference outcome; such a seller has reference-dependent preferences over revenue (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Köszegi and Rabin (2006) for general models of reference-dependence). Thus, a seller with aspirations cares about revenue and (possibly very slightly) how her sales price compares to a reference price. I demonstrate that a riskneutral seller with aspirations does best to conduct her sale via a no-reserve auction with a buy price in contrast to a pure auction and is indifferent between the auction component of her mechanism being a first-or second-price auction.
Model
A seller conducts the sale of a single unit of an indivisible good for which she derives value v 0 = 0 through an auction with a buy price B * and, if no bidder accepts the buy price, holds a second-price sealed-bid auction with reserve price r. The auction's buy price is "temporary" in that it disappears if no bidder is willing to exercise it. 3 There are n ≥ 2 risk-neutral bidders, each of whose valuation v i is private information and is an independent draw from the common distribution F that is continuous on its support [0, v] with a density f that is finite on its support and bounded away from zero. A bidder with valuation v i who wins the good at a price p earns surplus of v i − p and earns 0 otherwise. The number of bidders, buy price, reserve price, and the distribution of valuations are common knowledge. Thus, the model is within the symmetric independent private values framework. To demonstrate that a seller would set a buy price that some bidder types would exercise with positive probability in equilibrium, I additionally require that f ≡ df dv exists and is finite on its support. The novel feature of the model is the addition of a seller with aspirations. Such a seller cares about revenue and (possibly very slightly) how her sales price compares to a fixed reference price (which one can conceptualize as her aspired selling price).
4 Thus, if the good sells for price x ≥ 0, the seller's utility is x + δ(x − σ). The seller's reference price is σ and δ is a small positive number. I assume that the seller's reference price is σ = µr + (1 − µ)B * with µ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, a seller with aspirations cares about revenue and experiences a utility (disutility) of δ(x − σ) if x > (<)σ. Setting δ = 0 reproduces the standard model of a risk-neutral seller as a special case.
Results
The model I describe in the previous section induces a two-stage game of incomplete information among the bidders and seller. Given the seller's choice of B * and r, bidders decide whether or not to exercise the buy price in stage one and, if no bidder exercised the buy price, submit a bid to the auction in stage two. Ties are broken randomly. To analyze the model, I search for a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Since a standard second-price sealed-bid auction occurs if no bidder exercises the buy price, it is well-known that each bidder has a weakly dominant strategy to bid according to For a bidder with v i ≥ r, expected surplus from exercising the buy price given that rivals
On the other hand, for such a bidder, expected surplus from the auction is
(where the second equality follows from integration by parts). Following Mathews and Katzman (2006) , define as B(v i , r) the buy price that makes a bidder of type v i indifferent between the buy price and the auction. This threshold buy price solvesˆv This is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. Equilibrium bidding according to β S (v i ) = v i follows from a standard dominance argument. A necessary condition for v * to be part of an equilibrium is that π
Since v * satisfies B(v * , r) = B * , it is immediate that v i = v * equates (1) and (2). Note that
To see that this symmetric equilibrium is unique, note that because B(v i , r) is increasing in v i , the existence of somev = v * satisfying B(v, r) = B * would lead to a contradiction.
Denote the highest valuation x and the second-highest valuation y. Given the bidder behavior Proposition 1 describes, the seller's expected utility takes the form Proposition 2. Given bidders' equilibrium strategies, a seller with aspirations maximizes her expected utility by conducting a no-reserve auction with a buy price low enough that some bidder types would exercise it with positive probability in equilibrium.
Proof. Differentiating U (r, v * ) yields
Therefore, it is optimal to set r = 0, a no-reserve auction.
Note that if the seller sets v * = v, a buy price no bidder type would exercise with positive probability in equilibrium, we have
using (3) and the fact that ∂B/∂v * | v * =v = 0. However, differentiating again and evaluating at v * = v, we have
for all r ∈ [0, v] using again the fact that ∂B/∂v * | v * =v = 0 and that ∂ 2 B/∂v * 2 v * =v = 0. This implies that ∂U/∂v * < 0 to the left of v and, thus, that it is optimal to set v * < v, a buy price that some bidder types would exercise with positive probability in equilibrium.
Finally, a seller with aspirations is indifferent between first-and second-price auction rules of her auction with a buy price.
Proposition 3. First-and second-price auctions with a buy price are utility equivalent to a seller with aspirations.
Proof. Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with a buy price. If a bidder exercises the buy price if and only if v i ≥ v * and rejects it otherwise, expected surplus from exercising the buy price is as in (1). Since a standard first-price auction occurs if no bidder exercises the buy price, it is well-known that bidders with v i ≥ r bid according to
in a symmetric equilibrium. Thus, expected surplus from the auction is
which, substituting (5) and again using integration by parts to obtain the second equality, is identical to (2). Therefore, a bidder's threshold buy price satisfies (3) as in a secondprice auction with a buy price. Arguments similar to those in the proof of Proposition 1 establish the existence of a (unique) symmetric equilibrium in which a bidder with valuation v i exercises the buy price if and only if B * < B(v i , r) and bids according to (5) in the auction.
Given bidder behavior, the seller's expected utility takes the form U (r, v * ) = F (r) n (0 + δ(0 − σ)) +ˆv * r (β F (x) + δ(β F (x) − σ)) nF (x) n−1 f (x)dx +(1 − F (v * ) n )(B(v * , r) + δ(B(v * , r) − σ)) = −F (r) n δσ + nF (r) n−1 (F (v * ) − F (r))(r + δ(r − σ))
+ˆv * r (y + δ(y − σ))n(n − 1)F (y) n−2 f (y)(F (v * ) − F (y))dy
which, substituting (5) and again exchanging the order of integration of the double integral to obtain the second equality, is identical to (4).
Conclusion
I construct and study a model of an auction with a buy price for a seller with aspirations in the form of a reference price that depends upon the auction's reserve price and buy price. Such a seller does best to keep her aspirations sufficiently low by designing a no-reserve auction with a buy price low enough that some bidder types would exercise it with positive probability in equilibrium. Further, the seller is indifferent between the auction component of her mechanism being a first-or second-price auction.
